The Nuclear Regulation Authority holds a meeting on Feb. 18 about anti-terrorism facilities at nuclear plants. (Tomoyuki Suzuki)

EDITORIAL: NRA too chummy with utilities on anti-terrorism facilities

（社説）原発テロ対策　事業者の事情を優先か

The Nuclear Regulation Authority has decided to review the extension period for installing anti-terrorism facilities at nuclear power plants required by law.

A change in rules in accordance with the circumstances of the affected industrial organization will damage trust and will not heighten safety.

While remembering the tragedy that occurred 15 years ago, there is a need for discussions that will not leave despair among future generations.

The anti-terrorism facilities are known as a “specified severe accident response facility,” or “Tokuju,” and are designed to allow for remote cooling of reactors even in the event of a terrorist attack involving aircraft.

The facilities were obligated under new safety standards established after the triple meltdown at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant in 2011. 

Initially, a five-year extension period was established from 2013 when the new standards were enacted.

But in response to a request from the electric power industry, the period was revised in 2015 to within five years after completion of safety screening for the nuclear plant.

If the extension period ends and a Tokuju is not installed, nuclear plant operations must be halted.

Operations were resumed in 2024 at the No. 2 reactor of the Onagawa power plant operated by Tohoku Electric Power Co., but the utility plans to stop operations in December because it will be unable to install the facility in time.

In October 2025, organizations of electric power companies and manufacturers of related equipment asked that the extension period be increased to eight years on the grounds that construction work was taking longer than planned because the construction industry had revised its working conditions for employees.

While NRA commissioners were in agreement that the request could not be approved, they also decided to review the extension period since only one of 12 reactors with completed facilities did so on time.

One proposal is to start the five-year extension period not from the completion of the safety screening, but from the start of commercial operations of the reactor.

Even after the safety screening is completed, additional time is needed to obtain the consent of local governments.

If the proposal is applied, a number of reactors might avoid having to stop operations.

NRA Chairman Shinsuke Yamanaka has expressed caution about further lengthening the extension period.

But at a news conference after a recent NRA meeting, he also said that risks would not increase excessively even if the anti-terrorism facilities were not installed and that a stance of forcing utilities to abide by a promise that they could not keep was not desirable.

He stressed that the move was not deregulation, but continual improvement.

Such statements raise doubts about the NRA's stance on safety.

One lesson from the 2011 nuclear accident was to reflect new knowledge related to safety into standards and to obligate all nuclear plants to take measures in line with those new standards.

Extending the period without Tokuju needed for safety does not fall in line with the system placing a top priority on safety.

One reason given for being unable to prevent the 2011 accident was “regulatory capture” in which those regulated convinced the regulators to side with their logic.

The NRA also quickly followed the position of the government, which wanted nuclear plants to be allowed to operate even after 60 years, even though some commissioners were opposed.

Has the NRA undergone a transformation after being established under the principles of securing a safety culture and having independent decision-making?

This is a situation that damages trust in safety regulations.

The raison d’etre of the NRA is being questioned due to concerns that it is once again being captured by promoters of nuclear energy.

--The Asahi Shimbun, Feb. 25

原発に設置が義務づけられているテロ対策施設について、原子力規制委員会が設置までの猶予期限を見直す方針を決めた。業界団体の事情に沿ったルール変更は、信頼を損ねる。より安全を高める改変でもない。１５年前の悲惨な事故を思い起こし、後世に憂いを残さぬ審議が必要だ。
　テロ対策施設は特定重大事故等対処施設（特重）と呼ばれ、航空機によるテロ攻撃などがあっても遠隔で原子炉を冷やせるようにする。原発事故後の新規制基準で義務づけられた。当初は２０１３年の新基準施行から５年間猶予されたが、業界側の求めに応じて、１５年に原発本体の審査終了から５年以内と見直した。
　稼働中でも、特重が設置できないまま期限が来たら停止になる。２４年に再稼働した東北電力女川原発２号機は、期限に間に合わないとして今年１２月に停止する計画だ。
　電力会社や関連メーカーなどの業界団体が昨年１０月、建設業界の働き方改革で工期が長引いているとして、期限を８年に延ばすよう求めた。規制委は定例会で、要望は認めないことで一致しながらも、完成済みの１２基のうち間に合ったのは１基だけで、見直しが必要と判断した。
　５年以内の起点を、審査終了から「営業運転開始」まで先に延ばす案があるという。原発は、審査終了しても地元同意まで時間がかかる。案が適用されれば、複数の原発が停止を免れる可能性がある。
　規制委の山中伸介委員長は延長に慎重な考えを示していたが、委員会後の記者会見で、できないとしても「リスクが著しく上がるものではない」「できないものを強制的に約束だから守りなさいという姿勢も好ましくない」と述べ、規制緩和でなく「継続的改善」だと強調した。安全に対する姿勢が問われる。
　原発は事故の教訓から、安全に関する新たな知見が見つかれば基準に反映させ、すべての原発に対策を義務づける制度が設けられた。安全に必要な特重がない状態の延長は、安全性を最優先する制度の意図に沿っていない。
　そもそも、原発事故を防げなかった理由の一つとして、規制側が推進側に取り込まれる「規制の虜（とりこ）」が挙げられる。原発の６０年を超えた運転を可能にする制度でも、規制委は政府の方針に足並みをそろえ、反対する委員もいても性急に決定した。
　安全文化の確立、独立した意思決定の理念を掲げた規制委は変質したのか。安全規制の信頼を損ねる事態だ。再び推進側にのみ込まれていないか。存在意義が問われる。

(2026年2月25日)